

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 9 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

(Nigeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. G. GHELEV  
Mr. G. YANKOV  
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA  
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. PECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN  
Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU  
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. I. IACOB

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Miss M.R. de GUNZBURG

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the one hundred and ninety-seventh meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): In accordance with the procedure of work announced at our 191st meeting, I should like to discuss today President Johnson's proposal for the exploration of a verified freeze of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles (ENDC/120).

The Committee will recall that President Johnson proposed in his message of 21 January that, while we continued our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under international control, we ought also to endeavour to halt further increases in strategic armaments. His proposal is patterned after measures which have already been successfully negotiated, measures which have a common philosophy. This philosophy is simple and its logic irrefutable: to freeze the arms race where it is, as a starting-point for future arms reductions. A freeze of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear vehicles, if concluded today, would eliminate all the increases in numbers and improvements in characteristics of these vehicles which are currently planned. It would enable us to begin the actual reduction of armaments from their present levels, rather than from ever-higher levels. A freeze undertaken now would in fact have the same effect at any given future time as the destruction of all the weapons to be produced between now and that future time.

Here I should like to note again that we have also proposed another kind of freeze: a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes (ENDC/PV.191, pp.7 et seq.). The cut-off, if undertaken together with a freeze of nuclear vehicles, would go even further to set bounds on the arms race. Both types of freeze spring from the same philosophy. Both would constitute major practical steps towards disarmament which could be carried out in a reasonable period of time.

We believe that a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles is a matter in which both sides have a common interest. Adoption of the proposal would maintain the quantities of such vehicles held by East and West at constant levels, and prevent development and deployment of vehicles of significantly new types. Thus the existing rough balance would be maintained.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

The measure we are suggesting would be embodied in a treaty which would enter into force within an agreed interval after signature and ratification. During the interval between ratification of the treaty and its implementation, the parties to the agreement would complete the organization of their verification systems and prepare to implement the verification procedures. At present, as far as the United States is concerned, only the Soviet Union and the United States would be required to participate; other countries may wish, however, to be among the original parties.

Our freeze proposal suggests the inclusion of armaments in groupings which closely parallel the strategic armaments of both the USSR and the United States. All weapon systems in the strategic forces of both sides are included. The freeze would apply to strategic missiles and aircraft, within specified limits of range or weight, and would include anti-ballistic missiles and sea-based missiles. The groupings of affected armaments were specified in Mr. Fisher's statement of 16 April (ENDC/PV.184, p.16). Thus the dangers of nuclear conflict -- which have so often been stressed both in and outside this Conference -- would be contained.

Strategic anti-missile missile systems are included to ensure that the current strategic balance is maintained under the freeze. In the absence of a freeze, the deployment of such anti-missile missile systems based on present technology would be very unlikely to change the military balance, since the effect of enhanced strategic defences would be overcome either by increasing the offensive forces or by the addition of appropriate penetration aids. However, under a freeze of offensive systems, the deployment of effective strategic anti-missile missile systems by one side might shift the military balance. Furthermore, inclusion of strategic anti-missile missile systems in the freeze would relieve all parties of a large economic burden.

In the matter of limitations of production, it is our view that the production of all affected amounts and specified sub-assemblies for such amounts would be halted except for production required to cover natural attrition, losses due to accident, and, in the case of missiles, agreed annual quotas of confidence and training firings. Any replacement would be on a one-for-one basis of the same type.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

The basic pattern of the mix of strategic vehicles is maintained by the dual restriction of a one-for-one replacement by type and an agreed ceiling on the annual number authorized for replacement. The prohibition of new types of armaments would limit the scope of modernization and thus freeze the qualitative race within the scope of existing armaments and reduce the probability of any changes which could upset the strategic balance.

There is no intention to limit or to restrict space exploration. Therefore production of boosters to be utilized in space programmes would be authorized. However, production would be limited to those boosters actually required in the space programmes. Some limitation on missile launchers is an essential element of the freeze. However, the precise nature of such limitation is still under study.

Finally, we come to the matter of verification. In exploring the verification aspects of a freeze, we are convinced that verification requirements for this measure would be less onerous than for a production freeze on the entire range of major armaments, such as would be envisaged under our plan for general and complete disarmament. We believe that verification procedures for the freeze should be designed to reduce the scope of inspection while providing the necessary assurance of compliance. Such a system can be made effective without being burdensome; it can be made efficient without being intrusive.

Existing levels of armaments would not be subject to verification under the freeze. The verification arrangements we have in mind would concentrate on monitoring critical production steps, replacements, and launchings.

At subsequent meetings of the Conference I shall spell out the requirements for verification. The arrangements we will recommend are the result of many months of careful study and research. Every effort has been made to ensure that they meet the verification objectives I have already mentioned.

My Government continues to place great emphasis on President Johnson's proposal for a verified freeze of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear vehicles. We believe that it offers a genuine opportunity to put a halt to the arms race and the best possible foundation for further progress towards disarmament. I am sure that other delegations share this view and will find our proposals worthy of careful study.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The question of the freeze is on our agenda today. Our United States co-Chairman, in accordance with the agreement reached on the agenda, has asked that the proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles be the topic of discussion today, and he has just opened the debate on it. The choice of this proposal is very apt. We examined at the 193rd meeting the proposal concerning the cut-off. The debate on the freeze completes the study of the proposals before us on halting the arms race. The cut-off and the freeze have this much in common: if these proposals were translated into treaties the dangerous nuclear competition, which received its first check with the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), would as a result be considerably slowed down.

It is not by chance that I have mentioned the Moscow Treaty. We have all repeated several times that we must continue to work in the spirit of that treaty. The application of the cut-off and the freeze seems to follow quite naturally from the Moscow Treaty and to represent a stage which is comparatively accessible and easy to surmount. Today Mr. Timberlake again set forth the contents of the United States proposal, confirmed and clarified previous statements made on this question by the United States delegation (ENDC/PV.184, 186), and explained in what spirit that proposal had been put forward. I do not think it is for me to add anything on the substance of the problem. However, the Italian delegation, which has already stated its attitude to the freeze at the previous session (ENDC/PV.184), would like to submit to the Committee a few brief comments on the scope and significance of a possible agreement on the freeze.

We have asserted on several occasions that a halt in the arms race is a stage which is essential to any disarmament measure. It has already been objected that a halt which does not include the destruction of armaments is of no value. That objection is not a serious one. If that idea were accepted, the Moscow Treaty would have no importance, since it only represents a qualitative stoppage of the nuclear armaments race. But we know that the Moscow Treaty, while it does not provide for any destruction of bombs, has in fact had great influence and wide repercussions.



(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Once it has been established that a halt in the arms race is a measure which is not only useful but necessary, it is obviously desirable that there should be a general halt in all sectors. However, it is difficult to envisage such a sweeping measure, including controls which are of necessity very extensive, outside the framework of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, freezes in well-defined sectors are perfectly conceivable as first steps towards a general freeze, and among the various sectors the nuclear sector seems entitled to quite special priority. That is why the United States delegation, conscious of the need for a realistic, gradual and progressive method of approach, proposed the immediate freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles. We must now study this proposal more thoroughly with the help of all the delegations. Like any other proposal, it must be examined in the light of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5), and particularly of the principles relating to control and balance.

At a previous meeting I have already spoken of control in connexion with the halting of the arms race (ENDC/PV.193, pp. 24 et seq.). What I said then about the cut-off applies also to the freeze of vehicles. The measures to stop the arms race cannot dispense with certain controls, otherwise there would be no guarantee for the contracting parties. Those controls should be limited and strictly in proportion to the scale of the agreed freezes. It is this principle -- that it is desirable to avoid any intrusive or unnecessary control -- which inspires the United States proposals (ENDC/120, 134).

Of course, these proposals are technical and nothing would be more useful than to set up a study group on this question. The Soviet delegation now appears to be less opposed to the establishment of such groups, and there may therefore be hope that it will not oppose such a method of work as a means of arriving at mutually-satisfactory formulae.

The principle of balance in the application of the freeze deserves particular consideration, since more or less explicit objections have been raised to the freeze of strategic vehicles on the basis of that principle. Those objections were based on the presumed existence of a United States superiority in the field of strategic

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vehicles, so that a freeze of these vehicles would perpetuate a situation unfavourable to the Warsaw Treaty countries. However, we have only very rough estimates of the situation regarding the arms in question. We have received no information on this matter from any Soviet source, even unofficial. The Soviet leaders in their statements have not only never shown any concern about the existing situation, but have also frequently asserted that the Soviet Union is capable of repelling any nuclear attack and retaliating in kind. Such is the present situation according to the Soviet leaders. There is therefore no reason to suppose that, if a freeze of strategic vehicles were now decided on, the existing balance would be upset to the detriment of the Soviet Union. The present situation, if we are to believe the statements of the Soviet leaders, affords complete and absolute safeguards for the security of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Another objection which has been made to the proposal for a freeze is that the military appropriations released by the freeze of strategic vehicles could be used to swell other items in military budgets and to improve other armaments. It would merely be necessary to switch the effort from one sector of the defence apparatus to another. My reply is that, if that were the case, such a possibility would exist to an equal extent for both sides. The Soviet Union as well as the United States could, with the help of savings achieved in the sector of strategic vehicles, develop the production of armaments other than those vehicles. The two sides would thus be on a completely equal footing.

Moreover, as you know, the Western camp favours developing reciprocal technical knowledge of military budgets through exchanges of information. If that idea were accepted, it would be relatively easy to find out if the military efforts of a country were being switched from one sector to another, and each party would therefore be able to take the precautions which it deemed fit. But such precautions will certainly not be necessary. An agreement on a freeze in the most dangerous nuclear sector would revive general confidence; it would exercise an influence far beyond the sector of strategic vehicles. One can easily imagine that, once an agreement

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was reached on a freeze, the whole military effort would spontaneously slow down, the solution of political problems would be facilitated, the road would be wide open to further agreements on disarmament, and the general prospects of general and complete disarmament would be greatly improved.

I hope that the delegations of the Eastern countries, and all the other delegations present here, will devote the most careful attention to the proposal for a freeze, and that this will lead to the agreement we desire.

Mr. PECHOTA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): With your permission, today I should like to make a few observations on the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic offensive and defensive delivery vehicles (ENDC/120).

As we know, this proposal is not a new one. The Czechoslovak delegation has already stated its point of view of principle in regard to this subject when it was discussed last spring (ENDC/PV.186, pp. 7 et seq.). We shall, of course, study attentively the statement made today by the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake. I must say immediately, however, that the first impression we get from his statement is that it does not bring anything new and seems merely to confirm once more the justified comments and reservations which the Czechoslovak delegation has made in the past concerning the proposal for a freeze.

In previous statements of the United States delegation, as in the statement which the United States representative has made today, as well as in the statements of the delegations of other Western countries, we again meet with the assertion that adoption of the proposal for a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles would have great significance from the point of view of halting the arms race and from the point of view of disarmament. However, in evaluating any measure in the sphere of disarmament one cannot start from subjective positions or views but only from objective reality, from the consideration of what the implementation of the given proposal is likely to contribute to improvement of the present-day situation. If we evaluate the proposal to freeze strategic delivery vehicles precisely in the light of this criterion, its significance will be seen to be quite different from that which the delegations of the Western countries ascribe to it.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

What are the basic considerations which show that the proposal for a freeze cannot be an effective and mutually-acceptable measure? At the present time the principal danger and the main problem, to the solution of which we must give attention in the disarmament negotiations, is the elimination of the menace of a nuclear missile war. It is obvious, therefore, that any proposals concerning the problem of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles must be evaluated precisely in relation to the way in which they are likely to contribute to the solution of this problem. This factor has already been stressed a good many times during our negotiations. Moreover, it is evident that the danger of nuclear war comes, above all, from the enormous stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles accumulated as a result of the arms race.

During our negotiations some very telling figures have been quoted which show that, as regards both nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the present stockpiles are sufficient to destroy all life on our planet several times over. Thus a reduction or the complete elimination of the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war can be achieved only by taking radical measures for the complete destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and not at all by freezing their present numbers.

A significant feature of the United States proposal for a freeze is, in our opinion, the endeavour to secure an advantage at the expense of the other side. In all probability, when formulating their proposal, the competent United States organs based themselves on that assessment of the situation in the field of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles which is now so often given in official documents and statements, as well as in many publications in the West. These documents and statements show that the opinion prevails in the West that the number of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the possession of the United States is several times greater than the number in the possession of the Soviet Union.

I should like to recall once again that it does not matter to us what sources these data are taken from or how far they correspond to the truth. The important point is that the position of the United States and the other Western countries in regard to the future orientation of their arms programmes is based upon them. Characteristic in this regard is, for instance, the

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statement made by the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. McNamara, during the discussion of the war budget of the United States for 1964 in the relevant Sub-Committee of the United States Senate.

The Secretary of Defense of the United States made the following significant statement:

"The strategic retaliatory forces planned for the period ahead are fully adequate to their mission and further increases would provide only marginal gains in capability in comparison with the cost."

(Hearings before the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 88th Congress, First Session, p.9).

It appears to follow from this that the competent United States circles start from the assumption that their needs in regard to the quantity of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles will be covered in the main after completion of the arms programmes now being carried out, and that in the future they are not counting on any further substantial increase. As you see, these facts shed a very illuminating light on the proposal for a verified freeze of strategic delivery vehicles.

Another problem which inevitably arises if one examines the proposal for a verified freeze of strategic delivery vehicles -- and the way in which this problem is posed by the United States delegation causes us to have serious doubts -- is that of the control requirements in connexion with this proposal. We deem it appropriate to recall once again the place which control occupies in the whole disarmament process and, in particular, the mutual relationship which must be maintained between disarmament measures and control measures. Moreover, this is precisely what is stipulated in the relevant provision of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) of 1961. It seems to us that, if agreement in principle was achieved on this subject, there should no longer be any ambiguities in regard to it. It is generally acknowledged that no disarmament measures can be adopted without corresponding control, just as no control measure can be adopted without a corresponding disarmament measure.

We have already said that the proposed freeze of strategic delivery vehicles is not at all a measure which could be regarded as a disarmament measure.

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Moreover, it undoubtedly affects the most important sphere in the whole complex of factors which in the present conditions determine the military strength of the nuclear Powers.

In these circumstances it is legitimate to ask: on what are the control requirements contained in the United States proposal based? After all, it should be clear to everyone that any control -- and this applies with all the more force in the field of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles -- can be justified only in conjunction with corresponding effective disarmament measures. This indissoluble link between disarmament and control measures shows again that the most suitable prerequisites for solving the problem of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles are undoubtedly to be found within the framework of negotiations of general and complete disarmament.

But certain possibilities for carrying out effective measures in this field also exist outside the framework of general and complete disarmament. One can cite as an example the important Soviet proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft (ENDC/123). But in one way or another, whether we seek for a solution to the problem of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles within or outside the framework of general and complete disarmament, effective disarmament measures justify the requirements of corresponding control and at the same time create the necessary basis for the achievement of agreement on control. Outside a link with corresponding disarmament measures, no requirement for control has anything to do with control over disarmament, and must inevitably be regarded as a measure which would make it possible to collect information on existing armaments in a sphere where such information, in view of the importance of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, would affect the most sensitive spots where the safeguarding of the security and defence capability of any State is concerned.

The correctness of this conclusion is indeed fully confirmed by the United States proposal for a verified freeze of delivery vehicles. It is significant that the United States proposal gives great attention to the problem of control and puts forward great requirements in this respect. In the past -- and the statement made today by the United States representative is very significant in

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this regard -- the United States representatives have maintained that the control required would not be as extensive as the control which would have to be exercised in connexion with corresponding measures within the framework of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.184, p.18).

That is the main argument put forward by the Western Powers in support of their control requirements. But we have to admit that we fail to understand the logic on which that argument is based. Indeed, if one takes into account the character of the measures envisaged, it is altogether impossible to compare general and complete disarmament with the proposal for a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles. Equally unconvincing are the attempts to compare the control measures which would and should be carried out within the framework of general and complete disarmament with the control measures which are required in connexion with the proposal for a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles (ibid., pp.17, 18).

I do not intend this morning to analyse in detail the requirements for control over a freeze, especially as the United States representative himself said that he did not intend to spell out the requirements for verification envisaged in the United States plan. Nevertheless, we base ourselves on the statements which the United States representatives have made in the Committee in the past.

For our part, we consider that the mere list of the required verification measures which has been put forward by the United States delegation in the past fully entitles us to draw the conclusion that the implementation of such measures would lead to the establishment of extremely extensive control over armaments in the most sensitive sphere. Once again we must draw attention to the fact that this control is to be carried out at a time when not a single strategic delivery vehicle would have yet been destroyed and when their further production would still be going on, even though to a limited extent. Furthermore, the production capacity, which would make it possible to re-establish production on the present or even a greater scale in a short time, would remain intact. Moreover, as we know, the United States proposal -- judging from the explanation given by the United States representative on 16 April -- envisages that a possible agreement would include a clause under

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which any of the parties would be free to withdraw at any time from such a treaty on a freeze (ibid., p.18).

We think that these few considerations show clearly the reasons why we do not consider the proposal for a verified freeze of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, in the form in which it has been presented by the United States delegation, to be a suitable basis of which a mutually-acceptable agreement could be reached.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I should like to read out to the Committee the following communication from our Soviet co-Chairman:

"In accordance with the procedure of work announced at the 191st meeting, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submits for discussion by the Committee on 16 July the elimination of bomber aircraft".

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 197th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. L.C.N. Obi, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 14 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.